U.S. policy on Venezuela and Cuba: pressure, incentives, and the politics of sanctions (A detailed, original explainer)
U.S. policy toward Venezuela and Cuba is often discussed as if it’s one single “Latin America policy.” In reality, Washington treats them as two separate cases—but with a big overlap: energy, migration, and geopolitical alignment. Both policies are built around a familiar toolkit (sanctions, diplomacy, visas, enforcement, and selective carve-outs), yet they differ in history, legal structure, and how much room the U.S. president has to change course without Congress.
This article breaks down what the U.S. is trying to achieve, what tools it uses, how those tools have evolved, and why Venezuela and Cuba keep getting linked together.
1) The big picture: what Washington says it wants
Venezuela: “democracy + accountability” (plus energy realities)
Across administrations, the U.S. has framed its Venezuela approach around:
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backing a return to democratic governance and credible elections
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responding to human rights abuses and corruption
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limiting the Maduro government’s access to money and international finance
A concise, widely used summary of the U.S. sanctions framework and objectives appears in Congressional Research Service material on Venezuela sanctions policy. Congress.gov
Cuba: “pressure the state, support the people,” inside an embargo structure
Cuba is different because the baseline is the decades-long U.S. embargo (and related regulations). The State Department’s Cuba page describes U.S. goals in terms of a freer, more prosperous Cuba and a posture of “limited engagement,” but the policy is constrained by the broader sanctions/embargo system. State.gov+1
2) Venezuela policy in detail
A) Sanctions are the center of gravity
The Venezuela program is heavily sanctions-driven, administered primarily through the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC maintains a Venezuela sanctions program page and uses general licenses (broad permissions) and specific licenses (case-by-case permissions) to shape what business is allowed. OFAC
Sanctions typically aim to:
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block access to the U.S. financial system
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restrict transactions with key state entities (especially in energy)
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target individuals (asset freezes, travel bans, and related measures)
B) Oil policy: licenses as a “dial,” not an on/off switch
Venezuela is an oil state, so U.S. policy often turns on how strictly Washington restricts oil-related trade and finance.
A clear example of the “dial” approach was the transition from General License 44 (GL 44)—which had temporarily authorized certain oil-and-gas transactions—to General License 44A, which OFAC issued as a wind-down authorization (meaning: wrap up previously permitted activity by a deadline, rather than continue it). OFAC+2OFAC+2
That kind of move matters because it signals:
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whether Washington is prioritizing pressure (tightening flows of revenue to the government), or
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prioritizing bargaining leverage (allowing some activity in exchange for steps like election commitments), or
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prioritizing energy market stability (avoiding sudden supply shocks)
C) A major recent escalation: “control of oil sales” after political upheaval
In early January 2026, major U.S. outlets reported a dramatic shift in U.S. posture around Venezuela’s oil—describing an approach in which the U.S. would assert control over Venezuelan oil sales, including seized tankers and new arrangements for where proceeds are held and how sales are directed. AP News+2The Washington Post+2
These reports describe a policy that goes beyond classic “sanctions and diplomacy” into a much more direct form of control over energy flows, raising questions about:
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international law and sovereignty arguments (raised by critics abroad)
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the durability of any arrangement if political conditions shift again
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whether U.S. control mechanisms can be implemented consistently in global markets
Separately, industry reporting indicates the U.S. has begun issuing waivers that partially lift constraints while still controlling destinations—another sign of a tightly managed approach to oil flows rather than a full opening. Argus Media
D) Visa and entry restrictions can act as a parallel pressure tool
Beyond sanctions, U.S. administrations can impose entry restrictions affecting nationals of certain countries. A recent White House fact sheet describes continued partial restrictions for several countries, including Cuba and Venezuela. The White House
E) Migration is policy, not just an outcome
Venezuela’s crisis has been one of the biggest migration stories in the hemisphere. While sanctions are often the headline, U.S. policy is also shaped by:
(Exact program details shift frequently, but the key point is that migration policy and Venezuela policy constantly influence one another.)
3) Cuba policy in detail
A) The embargo is structural—and hard to unwind quickly
Unlike Venezuela, where sanctions can be adjusted through OFAC licensing and executive action, Cuba policy sits atop a long-standing embargo architecture and an extensive regulatory system. OFAC’s Cuba sanctions page is a starting point for how the U.S. administers these restrictions, including what categories of activity may be authorized. OFAC
In practice, U.S.-Cuba policy often becomes a debate about how strictly to enforce and how broadly to license within the existing framework.
B) Travel, remittances, and people-to-people channels are politically sensitive levers
Cuba policy is not only about trade. It’s also about:
The U.S. Embassy’s “Traveling to Cuba” guidance and the State Department’s Cuba travel page both point users toward the legal and regulatory structure that shapes what Americans can do. U.S. Embassy Cuba+1
C) Terrorism designation: a powerful switch with major financial consequences
One of the most consequential policy labels in U.S. foreign policy is the State Sponsor of Terrorism designation. It affects banking risk, export controls, and a country’s access to finance.
In January 2025, reporting and analysis noted steps by President Biden to remove Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, with discussion of how that interacted with other Cuba restrictions. Holland & Knight+2Congress.gov+2
(Policy status can change with administrations; what matters for understanding is that this designation is both symbolic and financially material, because it can spook banks and insurers even beyond formal legal restrictions.)
4) Where Venezuela and Cuba intersect
A) Energy and “lifelines”
Historically, Venezuela has been an energy supplier and political ally to Cuba, and U.S. policy planners have often viewed that connection as a channel of mutual support that can be disrupted through sanctions and enforcement.
In the January 2026 reporting on Venezuela, one recurring theme is that U.S. actions around Venezuelan oil—seizures, controlled sales, and destination management—can reshape who benefits from Venezuelan crude and under what terms. AP News+2The Washington Post+2
B) Regional diplomacy and signaling
U.S. policy toward these two countries also functions as:
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a message to allies in the region about democracy and governance norms
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a message to rivals (notably when oil shipments intersect with third-country buyers)
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a domestic political signal inside the U.S.
Because Cuba policy is historically charged in U.S. politics, it can harden quickly; Venezuela policy tends to swing more with immediate crises (elections, negotiations, oil markets, migration surges).
5) The main tools Washington uses (and what each can and can’t do)
1) Sanctions (targeted and sectoral)
Strengths
Limits
For Venezuela, OFAC’s licensing system illustrates the “calibration” model clearly. OFAC+1
2) Licensing and exemptions
Licenses are often the most important “fine print” in sanctions policy. When OFAC moved from GL 44 to a wind-down GL 44A, that was essentially Washington saying: “We’re narrowing the permitted space.” OFAC+1
3) Diplomatic engagement (or isolation)
Diplomacy can mean:
Cuba policy is often described by the U.S. as “limited engagement,” constrained by sanctions architecture. State.gov
4) Travel and entry restrictions
Travel rules affect:
Entry restrictions can also be used as a security tool, and recent White House materials show Cuba and Venezuela appearing in lists of countries under partial restrictions. The White House
5) Enforcement: seizures and legal actions
Enforcement can range from compliance actions against banks to high-profile seizures. January 2026 reporting describes tanker seizures and U.S. efforts to shape Venezuelan oil flows. AP News
6) The debate inside the U.S.: two competing theories of change
Theory A: “Maximum pressure forces political concessions”
Supporters argue sanctions and tight enforcement:
Theory B: “Pressure hardens regimes and deepens humanitarian harm”
Critics argue broad economic pressure can:
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worsen shortages and migration
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give governments an external enemy to blame
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reduce civil society space as states tighten control
Cuba is the classic example of this debate, with long-running arguments about whether the embargo has achieved its political goals or mostly punished ordinary Cubans. Encyclopedia Britannica
7) What to watch next (practical indicators)
If you want to track where U.S. policy is heading—without reading every speech—watch these signals:
For Venezuela
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New OFAC announcements: general licenses, FAQs, and enforcement updates OFAC+1
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Any expansion/rollback of oil-related permissions and destination controls Argus Media+1
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Whether the “control of sales” approach described in early 2026 reporting becomes institutionalized or contested The Washington Post+1
For Cuba
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Changes to restricted lists and compliance guidance
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State Sponsor of Terrorism status and related policy documents
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Shifts in travel/remittance enforcement priorities
Conclusion
U.S. policy toward Venezuela and Cuba is best understood as managed pressure: sanctions and enforcement are the default, while licenses and selective engagement are the adjustable parts. Venezuela policy has increasingly revolved around oil licensing, enforcement, and (recently) direct control mechanisms described in January 2026 reporting. Cuba policy, meanwhile, remains anchored in the embargo-era structure, with politically charged levers like travel, remittances, and terrorism designation status shaping the real-world impact.
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